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Study on Competitive Strategy of B2C Platform 
YuyingLou*,Zhenyu Liu 
(School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen,361005,China) 
 
Abstract:The article builds a competitive model of the incumbent and later entrant, considering the case of single-homing 
andmultihoming. Results show that the conditions that later entrant platform profits exceed incumbent platform are the same 
underthe case of single homing and multihoming. At the same time, the later entrant should turn to charge rather than 
subsidizingenterprise when two platforms get an equilibrium. Later entrant platform can focus on improving user's 
evaluation of one sideif it wants to exceed the incumbent in profits. Finally, the case of Tmall and Amazon China in B2C 
market is discussed. 
 
Keywords:two-sided market, B2C platform, competition strategy 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Along with the tremendous growth in B2C market, the concentration of market increases constantly.Tmall 
captures more than half of market and occupies the leading position in domestic B2C market since 
2011.However, other B2C platforms,such asAmazon China accounts for a small part of market. Online shopping 
competition developsconsistently, and the question whether Amazon China, as a later entrant representative, 
canexploitfollower advantages and achieve performance breakthrough is the keystone of the study. 
Platform competition has been studied extensively, and much of the literature focuseson pricing strategy of 
single platform, such as strategy of fee structure[1-4]and multihoming[5-7].Several studies investigate the issues of 
competitive coexistence between platforms. Shapiro and Varian(1999)[8]explain the causes of winner-take-all in 
networked market based on network effects,namely,there will be only one winner in the end when two or more 
companies are competing for a big market with positive feedback. Sun and Tse(2007)[9] discuss the coexistence 
condition of two competition networks in two-sided market.It is easier to emerge an only winner in a market 
with single-homing while market with multihoming tends to coexist.Goettler and Gordon(2014)[10]usea dynamic 
oligopoly model to examine the relationship between competition and product innovation and find an 
inverted-U relationship between product substitutability and innovation. Innovation benefits increase initially 
for enterprises. However when the market tends to be a winner-take-all one, laggards will abandon pursuit of the 
leader for the reason of few residual profits to fight.Other papers investigate market positioning strategy of later 
entrants.Bardey and Rochet(2010)[11]take risk factor into account and argue that heterogeneity of patient risk 
level provides a differentiated positioning opportunity for medical institutions.Medical institutions can 
successfully enter the market as long as its positioning strategy is reasonable. Based on the study of Bardey and 
Rochet,Fu(2011) [12]brings risk factor to bank card market and analyzes price strategy of China UnionPay and 
VISA. Results show that winner-take-all is not necessarily normal in bank card market which share the 
characteristics of two-sided market. Later entrant will find niche market whenever its market positioning and 
price structure are reasonable. Kim and Tse(2011)[13]study the strategy of later knowledge-sharing websites and 
consider the influence of accumulated knowledge,complexity of questions, and price structure of advertising on 
survivabilityof a latercomer.Paper shows that the longer the life span of accumulated knowledge, the higher the 
chance of survival of the latecomer.Eisenmann et al.(2011)[14]consider the barrier to enter for a potential entrant 
because of network effect, trying to explore the conditions under which envelopment strategies are likely to 
succeed. Research indicates that platform can envelope incumbent platform and take market share of rivals by 
                                                              
*Correspondingauthor. Email: yuli_lyy@outlook.com(YuyingLou)  
The Fifteenth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business－E-Business and Digital Innovation           99 
 
bundling two platforms function together.Zhu and Iansiti (2011)[15]discuss the competition based on platform 
quality and installed base between two platforms, which is alater entrant and an incumbent withoutstanding 
superiority.Adynamic game is developed and results indicate that installed base does not necessarily present 
barriers to entry. Mcintyreand Chintakananda(2014)[16]think that entrepreneurs seeking to enter a market 
effected by network effects needto solve threemajor problems before making entry decision. The first one is 
where is the network effects from in this market? The second is what is the strength of network effects in a given 
market?The last is whether there a dominant standard that has already locked in the market? 
Those studies are mainly aimed at competition between platforms with feature of two-sidedmarkets, while 
few work for B2C platform competition. Sounlike prior studies, we principally research on the competition 
strategy of B2C platform. Enterprises and consumers are the two sides in B2C platform. Their asymmetrical 
status makes B2C platform different from other platforms in two-sided markets.Ma and Liu(2013)[17]compare 
three B2C platforms revenue by building both static and dynamic pricing models.Findings reveal thatrevenues 
of platforms are consequently different because of their price structure. However the study focuses on the effect 
of price structure. In this paper, an asymmetric duopoly situation is considered to model competition between an 
entrant and an incumbent platform, where platform 1 is characterized by a larger market. In the cases of 
single-homing and multihoming, we want to know whether it is possible for later entrant platform to exceed the 
incumbent in profits. There are no fees for customers in B2C platform, such as Tmall, Jingdong Mall and 
Amazon China. So we assume that platform charge no fees toconsumers. Theincumbent charges a fixed fee to 
enterprises while later entrant subsidizes the enterprises. 
2. THE MODEL 
We assume that there are two platforms in B2C market. Platform 1 is the incumbent and platform 2 is later 
entrant. 1cN and 2cN are the number of consumers of platform 1and platform 2,respectively. 1sN and 2sN are the 
number of enterprises of platform 1and platform 2. 1V and 2V representthe service level of platform 1and platform  
2 ( )0, 1,2iV i> = . cλ and sλ denote the evaluation coefficient of platform 1 and platform 2 for consumers and 
enterprises, where [0,1]iλ ∈ .User will not joinone platform when ( )0 ,i i c sλ = = . cα and sα denote the cross network 
externality coefficient ( )0, ,i i c sα > = . 1sP represents that the incumbent charges a fixed fee to the 
enterprises. 2sP represents that later entrant subsidizes enterprises ( )0, 1,2siP i> = . 
 1 1 1c c s cU N Vα λ= +  (1) 
2 2 2(1- )c c s cU N Vα λ= +  (2) 
 1 2(1- )c c cU V Vα λ λ= + +  (3) 
Formula(1),(2),(3)represent the utility when consumersjoinplatform 1,platform 2 and both 
platforms,respectively,where consumer network effects is denoted by c siNα ,the perceived service utility of 
platform 1 for consumer is denoted by 1cVλ andthe perceived service utility of platform 2 for consumerdenoted 
by 2(1- )c Vλ . 
1 1 1 1s s c s sU N V Pα λ= + −  (4) 
 2 2 2 2(1- ) +s s c s sU N V Pα λ= +  (5) 
 1 2 2 1(1- ) +s s s s sU V V P Pα λ λ= + + −  (6) 
Formula(4),(5),(6)represent the utility when enterprisesjoin platform 1,platform 2 and both 
platforms,respectively,where enterprise network effects is denoted by s ciNα ,the perceived service utility of 
platform 1 for enterpriseis denoted by 1sVλ andthe perceived service utility of platform 2 for enterprise denoted 
by 2(1- )s Vλ .A consumer will join platform 1 rather than platform 2if 1 2c cU U> ,and vice versa. Similarly, an 
enterprise will join platform 1 rather than platform 2 if 1 1s sU U> ,and vice versa. 
2.1 Platform competition in the case of single-homing 
User can only choose to join one platform and make sure that utility is always positive, that 
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is 0( 1, 2)ciU i> = and 0( 1,2)siU i> = .We assume that market is completely covered[18],so 1 2 1c cN N+ = and 
1 2 1s sN N+ = are satisfied.In the case of single-homing, wethink of aHotellingtype of model where a mass 1 of 
enterprises are uniformlydistributed on a (0, 1) interval. Let’s suppose that platform 1 is located at 0 and 
platform 2is located at 1. t representsa transportation cost proportionalto their distance with platform 1 and 
platform 2.It is used to reflect the degree of difference between platforms and the greater the t ,the stronger the 
heterogeneity. Thenet utility function derived fromanenterpriselocated at x of platform 1and platform 2can be 
expressed as following formula(7). 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2(1- ) (1 ) 
s s c s s
s s c s s
N V P tx
N V P t x
α λ
α λ
Φ = + − −
Φ = + + − −   
(7) 
The address of indifferententerprise is
( ) ( )- +1 2 1 2 2 1 2( )1= +
2 2
s c c s s sN N V V V P Px
t
α λ + − − +
, thus 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
- +
- )+
1 1 2 2 1 2
1






s c s s s
s
s c s s s
s
N V V V P P
N
t





+ − − +
+ − − +−
 
(8) 





1 (2 1) (1 )
2 2
1 (1 2 ) (1 )
2 2
c s c c
c
c s c c
c
a N V VN
t




+ − + − −= +
+ − + − −= −
 
(9) 
We can know ciN and ( 1,2)siN i = are cross-correlationfrom formula(8)and(9).When ( )ci siN N increase,there is 
a corresponding increase of ( )si ciN N .It means,when more users of one side join the platform,it will also attract 
more users on the other side.Thisjust reflects the positive cross network externalities. 
By considering formula(8)and (9), we can get enterprisesnumber of platform 1and platform 2, respectively. 
[ ] ( )
[ ] ( )
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
2 2 
( ) (1 ) (1 )1
2 2 2
( ) (1 ) (1 )1
2 2 2
s s c s s c s s
s
c s
s s c s s c s s
s
c s
t a V t a V t P P
N
t a a
t a V t a V t P P
N
t a a
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
+ − − + − − += + −
+ − − + − − += − −  
(10) 
Thus, profits of platform 1and platform 2are: 
[ ] ( )
[ ] ( )
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 2
1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2
( ) (1 ) (1 )1
2 2 2
( ) (1 ) (1 )1=
2 2 2
s s c s s c s s
s s s
c s
s s c s s c s s
s s s
c s
t a V t a V t P P
P N P
t a a
t a V t a V t P P
P N P
t a a
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
⎛ ⎞+ − − + − − +∏ = = +⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ − − + − − +∏ − = − −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  
(11) 









( ) (1 ) (1 )1
2 2 2
( ) (1 ) (1 )1
2 2 2
 
s s c s s c s
s
s c s c s
s s c s s c s
s
s c s c s
t a V t a V tP t P
P t a a t a a
t a V t a V tP t P
P t a a t a a
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
+ − − + − −∂∏ = + −∂ − −
+ − − + − −∂∏ = − + −∂ − −  
(12) 









( ) (1 ) (1 ) 3( )
3
( ) (1 ) (1 ) 3( )
3
s s c s s c c s
s
s s c s s c c s
s
t a V t a V t a a
P
t
t a V t a V t a a
P
t
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
+ − − + − + −=
+ − − + − − −=
 
(13) 
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Replacingformula(13)into(10),we can know enterprisesnumber of platform 1and platform 2. 
( ) [ ]







3 2 ( ) (1 ) (1 )
6( 2 )
3 2 ( ) (1 ) (1 )
6( 2 )
c s s s c s s c
s
c s
c s s s c s s c
s
c s
t a a t a V t a V
N
t a a
t a a t a V t a V
N
t a a
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
− + + − − + −= −
− − + − − + −= −  
(14) 









3( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
=
18 ( )
3( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
=
18 ( )
c s s s c s s c
c s
c s s s c s s c
c s
t a a t a V t a V
t t a a
t a a t a V t a V
t t a a
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
− + + − − + −∏ −
− − + + − + −∏ −  
(15) 
Then, the difference between platform 2 and platform 1 is: 
[ ]{ }2 1 1 22 ( ) (1 ) (1 )3 s s c s s ct a V t a Vπ λ λ λ λΔ = ∏ −∏ = − + − − + − .When profits of platform 2exceeds platform 1,it 
should satisfy 0πΔ > ,that is to say, [ ]1 2( ) (1 ) (1 ) 0s s c s s ct a V t a Vλ λ λ λ+ − − + − < .After simplifying, we can get that 
1
2






− + −< + ,that is when
1
2






− + −< + ,profits of platform 2 will exceed platform 1. 
2.2 Platform competition in the case of multihoming 
User can choose to join both two platforms, and according to Hotellingmodel, we can know: 
( )
[ ]
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1
1 (1 )
s s c s s
s s c s s
N a N V P
t





= + − +
 
(16) 







c c s c
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It can be seen from formula(16)and(17), ciN and ( 1,2)siN i = are cross-correlation.When ( )ci siN N increase, 
there is a corresponding increase of ( )si ciN N .That meanswhen more users of one side join the platform,it will 
also attract more users on the other side. Thisjust reflects the positive cross network externalities. 








(1 ) (1 )
s c s
s s
s c s c
s c s
s s
s c s c
a t V tN P
t a a t a a
a t V tN P




− + −= +− −  
(18) 




1 1 1 1 12 2
2
2 2 2 2 22 2
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(1 ) (1 )
=- -
s c s
s s s s
s c s c
s c s
s s s s
s c s c
a t V tP N P P
t a a t a a
a t V tP N P P
t a a t a a
λ λ
λ λ
⎡ + ⎤∏ = −⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫− + −⎪ ⎪∏ = +⎨ ⎬− −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭  
(19) 
We demand 1∏ and 2∏ on 1sP and 2sP first orderpartial derivativesrespectively to obtain maximum profits. 
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(23) 
The ratio between platform 2 andplatform 1 is
[ ] 222
1 1








⎧ ⎫− + −∏ ⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬∏ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭ ,when profits of platform 
2exceed platform 1,it should satisfy 2
1
1∏ >∏ ,After simplifying,we can get
1
2






− + −< + ,that is to say, 
when 1
2






− + −< + profits of platform 2 will exceed platform 1.This is consistent with the 
conclusionin the case of single-homing. 
3. MODEL ANALYSIS 
In this paper, number of enterprises, pricing strategy and profits of two platforms are discussed in the case 
of single-home and multihoming.Results suggest that the conditions thatplatform 2outstrips platform 1in profits 
are the same. Thisindicates that the impact of user’sstate of attributionplays a minor role in platform 
competition. 
Conclusion 1: inthe case of single-home and multihoming, the conditions thatplatform 2outstrips platform 
1in profits are the same. 
When profits of platform 2exceeds platform 1,itwill satisfies 1
2






− + −< + ,now two cases are 
discussed. 
• cλ and sλ are symmetric 






− + − >+ ,the size of 1V and 2V can notbe ascertained. 






− + − <+ ,thus, 1 2V V< . 
• cλ and sλ are asymmetric 







+ compared with 1,sothe 
size of 1V and 2V cannot be ascertained;It is the same when 1/2< cλ <1,0< sλ <1/2.Table 1 is discussion on 
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differentvalues of cλ and sλ . 
Table 1.Discussion on different values of cλ and sλ  
 0< cλ <1/2 1/2< cλ <1 
0< sλ <1/2 cannot be determined cannot be determined 
1/2< sλ <1 cannot be determined 1 2V V<  







+ will less than 
1,thus 1 2V V< .It means when the evaluation coefficient ofconsumers and enterprises are both very 
high,theservice level of platform 2will be superiorto platform 1 if it outstrips platform 1in 
profits.When0< cλ <1/2,0< sλ <1/2 or in the case of cλ and sλ are asymmetric,the servicelevel of platform 2 can 
be higher or lower than platform 1 ifitexceeds platform 1 in profits,socondition isrelatively loose. Platform 2 
will obtain much more profits than platform 1 as long as 1
2






− + −< + is satisfiedregardless of service  
level.For platform 2, it will need to pay more effort and cost to improve evaluation to a high level 
simultaneously. So it can reduce user evaluation of both two sides or focus on improving user experience of one 
side to get highevaluation.However, it is difficult to survivein the market for platform with low evaluation of 
both two sides. Therefore, to vie for market and get more profits than platform 1,platform 2 should primarily 
improve evaluation of one side. 
Conclusion 2: to vie for market and get more profits than platform 1,platform 2 should primarily improve 
evaluation of one side. 
From formula (13)and(21) we can see 2 0sP < when competition equilibrium existsin the case of single-home 
and multihoming.Itindicatesplatform 2 should charge fees to enterprises instead of subsidy under maximization 
of profit. Soin early phase of entry, it is not a permanent measure to subsidize enterprises to get them on board. 
Conclusion 3:later entrant should chargefees to enterprises in order to obtain much more profits than the 
incumbent whencompetition equilibriumexists. 
4. CASE ANALYSIS 
Tmall, beingthe leader of B2C market inChina since 2011,comes from Taobao which started from 
2003.Large numbers of enterprises and numerous consumers are attracted for its large market share and 
unexampled advantages in flow.Enterprises of Tmallnot only need pay deposit and use cost,but also need pay 
high advertisement costs togainplatform flow.Amazon is the world's largest electronic business 
company.Combinedwith joyo.com,it began to enter into Chinese market in 2004 and renamedAmazon China in 
2011.Different from other B2C platforms in China,such as Tmall,Jingdongmall,Amazon Chinaadopts“zero 
investment” patternwithout deposit and use cost. Enterprises only need to pay commission and logistics expense. 
What’s more, there’s no advertising cost. It provides a fair competitive environment for different sellers of the 
same product to enjoy same exposure opportunity and flow.Meanwhile,Amazon China creates unifiedpromotion 
and marketing, whichprovides numerousfree services,includingpage display, mail advertising and personalized 
recommendation engine.Thanks tosimplified marketing process,enterprisescan focus on selling all manner of 
products.Amazon China subsidizes enterprises by offering free services. 
However,Amazon China has been in a tepid state since its entry to China.Fromfigure 1,we can 
seeTmallranks first with 441 billion while Amazon China,less than a tenth of Tmall,ranksseventh.Meanwhile, 
Amazon Chinais at the bottom of the list with a rate of 42.6% in the top10 China B2C online retail growth rates 
of 2013. 
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Figure 1.The top10 China B2C online retail transactions and growth rates in 2013 
Comparing withrapid growth of China B2C platforms, the development of Amazon China appears to be 
excessively slow. This phenomenon mainly comes from threeaspects.Firstly,Amazon China put emphasis on 
developinginfrastructureconstruction at the beginning, like layout of warehousing logistics andthe building of IT 
system for instance.However,Amazon China made its first ever loss in 2012 because of the impact of high input 
in logistics and technology.There is no deposit or use cost in Amazon China and enterprises are provided with 
various promotionservice,which also lead to a considerable expenditure.Secondly,it is not in accordance with 
consumer shopping habits for its monotone website design.Thirdly,there are different kinds of sales promotion 
in China, such as Double 11shopping spree of Tmalland“6·18”anniversary sale of Jingdong.They aregood ways 
to attractconsumers and receivepraise.But,Amazon Chinais not keen tolower prices to entice customers. 
Hence,platformevaluation of consumers are generally not high. 
Conclusion 1 indicates that user state of attribution is not the key factor in profit competition.ThusAmazon 
China will get ahead of Tmall as long as 1
2






− + −< + .According to conclusion 2,Amazon China 
shouldimprove its site layoutcombined with user habits toenhance user experience.In tandem,it is essential to 
provide more personal service toimprove consumer evaluation. 
In order to make a profit breakthrough,Amazon Chinashould shrinks its spending and reduce the 
construction of logistics infrastructure investmenton the one hand. On the other hand, charging fees to 
enterprises is needed.It is not a permanent solution to subsidize enterprises to get them on board in initial phase 
of platform development.This is also consistent with conclusion 3. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In the case of single-home and multihoming,we firstly consider competitive strategy of the incumbent and 
later entrant,whichdiffer in service level and evaluation.Then the condition of later entrant profit exceeding the 
incumbent is studied.Finally,the case of Tmall and Amazon Chinaisdisscussed.The conclusions are as follows: 
• In the case of single-home and multihoming,the conditions that platform 2 outstrips platform 1in 
profits are the same. 
• In order tovie for market and get more profits than the incumbent,laterentrant should substantively 
improve service level and evaluation of one side in platform. 
• Later entrant should chargefees to enterprises in order to obtain much more profits than the incumbent 
when competition equilibriumexists. 
The B2C market of China is developing rapidly,and the duopoly market pattern consist of Tmall and 
Jingdongis gradually being formed.Other B2C platforms are trying to seek for new market space and enhance its 
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core competitive advantage by supply chain integration,productdevelopment,brand building and service 
optimization.Burgeoningvertical B2C platforms,such asVipshop and Jumei areexamples of later 
entrants.Thus,later entrant can still create a better performance as long as itsmarket positioning is appropriate. 
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